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EVERYBODY’S GOT A PRICE: WHY
ORANGE COUNTY’S PRACTICE OF
TAKING DNA SAMPLES FROM
MISDEMEANOR ARRESTEES IS AN
EXCESSIVE FINE
Michael Purtill *
I. INTRODUCTION
Charlie Wolcott was cited in May 2009 for allegedly trespassing on
railroad property in Orange County, California. 1 Mr. Wolcott, a war
veteran, had no prior arrests. 2 At his hearing, he hoped to tell the judge that
the “No Trespassing” sign was yards away and that he was simply walking
through the property as a shortcut. 3 Moments before his hearing, however,
a deputy district attorney pulled him into a soundproof room and offered
him a deal: the county would drop the charges if Wolcott agreed to submit a
DNA sample. 4
Orange County is the only county in California to maintain its own
DNA database aside from the official California state DNA database.5 This
independence allows the county to work outside of the rules in place
governing the federal and state DNA databases. 6 Unlike the state and
federal DNA databases, which were created by statute and contain various
procedural safeguards, the county database was created and is managed by
the district attorney’s office. 7
*
Candidate for Juris Doctor, Northwestern University School of Law, May 2011. Thank
you to Professor Dorothy Roberts and to Warren Lipschitz, Dave Van Der Laan, Libby
O’Neill, Matthew Berry, and Dimitrios Angelakos, all of who helped me immensely in
writing this Comment.
1
Tami Abdollah, D.A.’s Database Growing in O.C., L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2009, at A3.
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
CAL. PENAL CODE § 296(a)(2)(C) (West 2008). In 2009, California began mandating
the collection of DNA samples from all individuals arrested for a felony.
6
Abdollah, supra note 1, at A3.
7
See id.
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Mr. Wolcott, who admitted to being “freaked out” by the whole
experience, is one of approximately 7,500 individuals who agreed to submit
a DNA sample to the county in exchange for the county dropping nonviolent misdemeanor charges against them. 8 The county district attorney’s
office has quadrupled the size of its DNA database to 15,000 samples since
January 2009, in large part due to individuals like Wolcott. 9 The county
explains the program to participants like Wolcott, but when faced with
possible criminal prosecution, it is unclear how informed defendants are
when they agree to submit to the county program. 10 The district attorney
justifies the program on the grounds that it will deter criminal activity and
become a powerful tool for criminal investigations.11
Civil libertarians and law professors question the program’s fairness. 12
Although the county claims that the program is voluntary for arrestees, one
defense attorney suggests that she will advise all of her clients to submit a
sample and avoid criminal prosecution. 13 The $75 fee itself may be a
particular burden to poor individuals who submit a DNA sample. 14
Even law enforcement officials are critical of the county’s actions.
The president of the Association of Orange County Sheriffs questions the
deterrent effect of the program, arguing that there is no scientific evidence
to suggest that the threat of DNA collection in exchange for release actually
Further, he contends that the program has a
deters criminals.15
demoralizing effect on officers in the field who arrest suspected criminals
only to see them released without charges.16
There are several potential legal challenges to the county’s DNA
collection program. Federal and state statutes authorize the collection of
DNA from certain criminals, most commonly for those convicted of sex
crimes and other violent offenses. 17 Several states also authorize the
collection of DNA from arrestees in certain circumstances.18 While statutes
authorizing DNA collection from convicts have been universally upheld,
courts are split on the constitutional validity of statutes authorizing DNA
8

Id.
Id.
10
Tami Abdollah, Arrested in O.C.? A DNA Sample Could Buy Freedom, L.A. TIMES,
Sep. 17, 2009, at A1.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
The DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §14135a (2006).
18
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §15:609(A)(1) (2004); VA. CODE ANN. §19.2-310.2:1
(1996).
9
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collection from arrestees. 19 Challengers argue that these statutes authorize
improper searches under the Fourth Amendment. 20
The county’s program could also be challenged on Fourteenth
Amendment equal protection grounds.21 One estimate suggests that 90% of
urban black males will be arrested at some point in their lives. 22 Since there
are necessarily more arrests than convictions, racial disparities in the
county’s DNA database may be even more severe than in databases
currently in use.
The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments provide interesting bases
from which to challenge the county’s DNA collection program. A thorough
discussion of each potential constitutional challenge to the county’s
program is beyond the scope of this Comment. Instead, this Comment will
focus on whether a county government’s decision to drop criminal charges
in exchange for a DNA sample to be permanently entered in a database and
a $75 fee constitutes an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment
Excessive Fines Clause. 23 This Comment will briefly summarize the
current discussion on the constitutionality of statutes authorizing DNA
collection from arrestees. From there, it will discuss the text, history, and
judicial interpretations of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment. Ultimately, this Comment will show that Orange County’s
program violates the Eighth Amendment rights of citizens to be free from
the imposition of excessive fines.
II. STATUTES AUTHORIZING COLLECTION OF ARRESTEES’ DNA AND THEIR
CONSTITUTIONALITY
The county program maintains an individual’s DNA indefinitely
regardless of the disposition of the arrestee’s case. 24 All fifty states
19

Compare In re Welfare of C.T.L., 722 N.W.2d 484, 492 (Minn. Ct. App. 2006)
(holding that Minnesota’s statute authorizing the taking of DNA from arrestees violates the
Fourth Amendment), with Anderson v. Commonwealth, 650 S.E.2d 702, 706 (Va. 2007)
(holding that DNA collection from an arrestee is justified). See also infra Part II.
20
See infra Part II.
21
See D.H. Kaye & Michael E. Smith, DNA Identification Databases: Legality,
Legitimacy, and the Case for Population-Wide Coverage, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 413, 452–457
(2003) (describing racial skewing of DNA databases); see also Mark A. Rothstein & Sandra
Carnahan, Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope of Law Enforcement DNA Data
Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127, 146 (arguing that distinguishing between types of criminals
would classify such arrestees in a matter that would warrant rational basis review because
types of crimes are not suspect classifications).
22
Kaye & Smith, supra note 21, at 455.
23
The Eighth Amendment, which includes the Excessive Fines Clause, reads: “Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
24
Abdollah, supra note 10, at A1.
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authorize criminal DNA databases, and every state—including California—
requires that DNA samples be taken from certain convicts, most commonly
convicted sex offenders. 25 Several states and the federal government
authorize the collection of DNA at the time of arrest for certain crimes. 26
These statutes, however, authorize the collection of DNA upon arrest for
felonies and federal crimes, not simple misdemeanors. Further, these
statutes require the destruction of the DNA sample when certain conditions
are met, such as the charges being dropped or the individual being acquitted
of the crime. 27 The Orange County program has no such provision;
individual samples are maintained in the DNA database indefinitely.
Courts are split on the constitutionality of taking DNA from arrestees.
The federal statute and two conflicting judicial interpretations thereof
provide an excellent starting point for the discussion. 28 Although both of
these cases focus on the statute’s constitutionality under the Fourth
Amendment, there are several relevant issues that suggest how future courts
would rule on an Eighth Amendment challenge.29
25

Aaron P. Stevens, Note, Arresting Crime: Expanding the Scope of DNA Databases in
America, 79 TEX. L. REV. 921, 922–23 (2001).
26
See, e.g., Violence Against Women Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14135a (2006); DNA and
Forensic Identification Database and Data Bank Act of 1998, CAL. PENAL CODE § 295 (West
2008).
27
See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 14132(d)(1)(A) (2008) (requiring the director of the FBI to
expunge an arrestee’s record if the conviction is overturned or if the charges are dropped, the
individual is acquitted, or the individual is never charged); CAL. PENAL CODE § 299
(requiring the destruction of an individual’s DNA sample if the person has no past, present,
or pending charge which qualifies for inclusion in the database; the person is never charged
with the crime for which he or she was arrested; the individual’s conviction has been
reversed or his or her case has been dismissed; or the individual has been found not guilty of
the charged offense).
28
See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a (2006) (“The Attorney General may, as prescribed by the
Attorney General in regulation, collect DNA samples from individuals who are arrested,
facing charges, or convicted or from non-United States persons who are detained under the
authority of the United States.”).
29
A thorough discussion of Fourth Amendment cases is well beyond the scope of this
Comment. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Searches must be based on probable cause. If there is no warrant or
showing of probable cause, the search must fall into one of two exceptions: the “special
needs” exception or the “totality of the circumstances exception.” For a thorough
explanation of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the application of the “special needs”
and “totality of the circumstances” exceptions to the probable cause requirement, see
generally John D. Biancamano, Arresting DNA: The Evolving Nature of DNA Collection
Statutes and Their Fourth Amendment Justifications, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 619 (2009); Paul M.
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In United States v. Pool, a criminal defendant pled not guilty to a
crime involving possession of child pornography. 30 The defendant had no
prior criminal record. At his arraignment, he agreed to a series of pretrial
conditions but refused to submit to court-ordered DNA testing as required
by the Bail Reform Act 31 and the DNA Fingerprinting Act of 2005. 32 He
challenged both statutes on the grounds that they authorized an
unconstitutional search.33
The court rejected Pool’s argument, but suggested that it would not
authorize DNA collection from all arrestees. First, the court rejected Pool’s
argument that the presumption of innocence for criminal defendants
warrants a “special needs” analysis for the reasonableness of a search.34
Because the defendant had already been indicted and arraigned, he was
subject to greater restrictions than an “ordinary citizen.” 35 The court
reasoned that “[t]he judicial or grand jury finding of probable cause within a
criminal proceeding is a watershed event . . . . After such a judicial finding,
a defendant’s liberty may be greatly restricted—even denied.” 36
Although the court was willing to uphold the legality of collecting
DNA from Pool and other pretrial detainees, it was not willing to extend its
holding to misdemeanor arrestees:

Monteleoni, DNA Databases, Universality, and the Fourth Amendment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
247 (2007).
30
645 F. Supp. 2d 903 (E.D. Cal. 2009), aff’d United States v. Pool, No. 09-10303, 2010
U.S. App. LEXIS 19133 (9th Cir. Sept. 14, 2010).
31
See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(b). The statute provides:
Release on personal recognizance or unsecured appearance bond. The judicial officer shall
order the pretrial release of the person on personal recognizance, or upon execution of an
unsecured appearance bond in an amount specified by the court, subject to the condition that the
person not commit a Federal, State, or local crime during the period of release and subject to the
condition that the person cooperate in the collection of a DNA sample from the person if the
collection of such a sample is authorized pursuant to section 3 of the DNA Analysis Backlog
Elimination Act of 2000 (42 U.S.C. § 14135(a)), unless the judicial officer determines that such
release will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required or will endanger the
safety of any other person in the community.
32

Pub. L. No. 96-162, § 1001–05 (codified 42 U.S.C. § 14135a).
Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 905–06.
34
Id. In most cases, for a search under the Fourth Amendment to be “reasonable,” it
must be based on individualized probable cause. Courts recognize exceptions to this
doctrine, however, when a “special need” exists that requires government officials to go
outside the restrictions placed on law enforcement. For a thorough special needs analysis of
DNA collection statutes, see Tracey Maclin, Is Obtaining an Arrestee’s DNA a Valid Special
Needs Search Under the Fourth Amendment? What Should (And Will) The Supreme Court
Do?, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 102, 107–08 (2005).
35
Pool, 645 F. Supp. 2d at 909.
36
Id.
33
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The undersigned emphasizes what this holding does not encompass. It does not
authorize DNA sampling after citation or arrest for infractions or misdemeanors, as in
these cases there will be no judicial finding of probable cause soon after the arrest or
citation, or no grand jury finding before or after the arrest. See, Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(a).
It does not authorize police officials to perform DNA sampling prior to a judicial
finding of probable cause which must be made within 48 hours after arrest and
detention. Again, it is the finding of probable cause on criminal charges which allows
the court to set release conditions similar to those of probation and parole, which is
37
the underpinning of the court’s holding in this case.

The court seems to suggest that without a judicial or grand jury finding
of probable cause, the taking and storage of DNA from an arrestee
constitutes a punishment in the absence of a conviction.
Just months after Pool, a federal district judge in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania disagreed with the Pool court and held that the DNA
collection statute was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 38 In
United States v. Mitchell, the defendant was indicted for allegedly
attempting to possess five kilograms or more of cocaine with intent to
distribute. 39 He objected to the trial court’s request for a pretrial DNA
sample and a magistrate judge stayed the DNA collection until the district
court could hear the case.40
The court rejected Pool’s holding that the grand jury indictment carries
special weight in the determination of a defendant’s guilt.41 According to
the Mitchell court, the presumption of innocence stays with a criminal
defendant until a verdict is entered, and it is unjust to treat him as though he
is guilty at the indictment stage. 42 The court also placed particular weight
on the intensely private nature of DNA data. 43 An individual has a strong
interest in keeping his “complex and comprehensive” genetic information
private. 44 Once information becomes pervasively available to the public,
however, the individual may lose his privacy interest in the information. 45
This concern warrants Fourth Amendment protection of an individual’s
DNA when he is presumed to be innocent of any crime. 46

37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46

Id. at 913 (emphasis in original).
United States v. Mitchell, 681 F. Supp. 2d 597 (W.D. Pa. 2009).
Id. at 599.
Id.
Id. at 603–04.
Id. at 606.
Id. at 607.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The court also found that DNA databases serve an inherently
investigatory purpose that photograph and fingerprint databases do not.47
Because a law enforcement agency can run a search against all the samples
in the DNA database any time it wants, the individual who submits his
DNA is subject to countless searches without a warrant or showing of
probable cause. 48 Further, because DNA is immutable, there is no
possibility of an individual altering his DNA to hide his identity. 49 If a law
enforcement agency has a reasonable suspicion that an individual is
involved in criminal activity, it can seek out a warrant for his or her DNA
and can conduct a search legally. 50
Mitchell supports the proposition that maintaining an arrestee’s DNA
indefinitely stretches the prosecutorial power beyond what is
constitutionally acceptable. Although Pool allows the collection of a
defendant’s DNA prior to conviction, it is noteworthy that the Pool court
was persuaded in part by the procedural safeguards associated with an
indictment. Orange County’s program does not wait until a defendant is
indicted to collect and preserve his DNA sample.
To reiterate, both of these cases concentrated their analyses on the
Fourth Amendment. These cases are relevant, however, to understand the
punitive nature of DNA collection statutes, especially when they require the
collection of DNA from individuals who are still presumed innocent. To fit
the county’s DNA collection program into the Eighth Amendment
excessive fine framework, it is necessary to discuss the text and history of
the Excessive Fines Clause.
III. THE EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE: TEXT AND HISTORY
The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution states: “Excessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.” 51 An originalist interpretation of the term “fine” is
“a pecuniary punishment; penalty; forfeit; money paid for any exemption or
liberty.” 52
The Supreme Court did not hear a case interpreting the Excessive
Fines Clause (the Clause) until 1989. 53 When the Court did analyze the
47

Id. at 609.
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
52
JOHN WALKER, A CRITICAL PRONOUNCING DICTIONARY (1791).
53
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989)
(holding that the Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to awards of punitive damages in
civil actions between private parties).
48
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Clause, it summarized the historical context in which the Clause was
adopted to discern its meaning. At least eight of the original thirteen states
already had an excessive fines clause in their declaration of rights or state
constitution. 54 The Clause was adopted almost verbatim from the English
Bill of Rights. 55 Prior to the adoption of the English Bill of Rights, judges
had used their power to fine convicts to extract revenge on the King’s
enemies. 56 Some of the King’s opponents were unable to get out of jail
because of disproportionate fines levied from the bench. 57 The Excessive
Fines Clause is in place to “limit[] the ability of the sovereign to use its
prosecutorial power, including the power to collect fines, for improper
ends.” 58
One common fine is a required forfeiture of money as part of a
punishment for a criminal act.59 In Powell v. Texas, an alcoholic pled guilty
to violating a Texas statute that forbade individuals from being intoxicated
in public. 60 The trial court ordered him to pay $20. 61 Fines such as the one
in Powell are criminal forfeitures; the fine is imposed after the individual
has been convicted of a crime.
A penalty imposed by the government on an individual does not
necessarily have to attach itself to a criminal conviction to be a fine.
Several statutes allow for the seizure of an individual’s property when that
property is used in the course of a criminal act; 62 this government action is a
civil forfeiture, where conviction is not a prerequisite. 63 The traditional rule
54

Id. at 264.
“Excessive Bail ought not to be required, nor excessive Fines imposed; nor cruel and
unusual Punishments inflicted.” 1 Wm. & Mary, 2d Sess., ch. 2, 3 Stat. at Large 440, 441
(1689).
56
Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 267.
57
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977).
58
Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 267.
59
See, e.g., Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 517 (1968).
60
Id. (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE, art. 477 (1952), which stated: “Whoever shall get
drunk or be found in a state of intoxication in any public place, or at any private house
except his own, shall be fined not exceeding one hundred dollars.”).
61
Id. Powell appealed on the grounds that his chronic alcoholism made it impossible to
abide by the statute. The Supreme Court rejected this contention and held that fining an
individual with alcoholism for public drunkenness does not necessarily constitute cruel and
unusual punishment. Id. at 535.
62
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 981 (2006) (subjecting real and personal property to forfeiture
when used in the commission of certain federal offenses); 18 U.S.C. § 1955(d) (2006)
(allowing for the forfeiture of any property used in violation of the Prohibition on Illegal
Gambling Businesses statute); 18 U.S.C. § 2253 (2006) (allowing for the seizure of real and
personal property pertaining to or obtained with profits from the sale or production of child
pornography when an individual has been convicted of a relevant offense); 31 U.S.C. § 5316
(2006) (allowing for forfeiture of property in money laundering offenses).
63
The Palmyra, 25 U.S. 1, 15 (1827).
55
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was that civil forfeiture, as opposed to criminal forfeiture, was against the
property itself and not the individual. 64 As a result, the guilt or innocence
of the owner was irrelevant. In The Palmyra, the Supreme Court held that a
criminal conviction was not necessary to allow the government to seize the
property of a ship owner and his crew suspected of piracy. 65 The Palmyra
stands for the proposition that a fine is a required forfeiture of property by
an individual to the government. It does not have to be attached to a
conviction; the property itself is considered to be guilty. 66
The Supreme Court altered the course of excessive fines jurisprudence
in 1993. In Austin v. United States, the Court resolved the question of
whether a civil forfeiture can be excessive under the Excessive Fines
Clause. 67 The defendant was indicted on four counts of violating South
Dakota’s drug laws, and the United States government filed an civil action
seeking forfeiture of the defendant’s mobile home and auto body shop
under 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(4) and 881(a)(7). 68 Austin filed suit against the
Government, alleging that the required forfeiture of his property represented
an excessive fine under the Eighth Amendment. 69
The Court first rejected the Government’s argument that the Eighth
Amendment protection against excessive fines is limited only to criminal
actions. The Fifth and Sixth Amendments explicitly mention criminal
prosecutions to limit their scope to criminal proceedings; the Eighth
Amendment has no such limitation. 70 Further, the Framers, in discussing
64
Id. at 14. This explains the interesting party names in this field of law. See, e.g.,
United States v. $184,505.01 in U.S. Currency, 72 F.3d 1160 (3d Cir. 1995).
65
Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 15.
66
This is a recent development brought about by the Court’s decision in Austin v. United
States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993). Prior to Austin, courts viewed civil forfeiture as “a means of
remedying the government’s injury and loss.” United States v. A Parcel of Land with A
Bldg. Located Thereon at 40 Moon Hill Road, Northbridge, Mass., 884 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir.
1989).
67
Austin, 509 U.S. at 602.
68
Id. at 604–05. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (2006) provides, in relevant part:

The following shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States and no property right shall exist
in them: . . . (4) All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or vessels, which are used, or are
intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt,
possession, or concealment of property described in paragraph (1), (2), or (9) . . . . (7) All real
property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold interest) in the whole of
any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be
used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of, a violation of this
subchapter punishable by more than one year’s imprisonment.
69
70

Austin, 509 U.S. at 606.
Id. at 607–08. The Fifth Amendment reads:

No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on
presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or
in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be
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the Bill of Rights, made a conscious choice to limit the Fifth Amendment
self-incrimination clause to criminal proceedings, and then moved the
debate to discussion of the Eighth Amendment, to which there was no
The Eighth Amendment limits the
motion to limit its scope. 71
government’s ability to punish individuals in both the criminal and civil
contexts. 72 The pertinent question in an excessive fines analysis is not
whether the forfeiture is civil or criminal, but whether it is a punishment.73
The Court next turned its attention to whether a civil forfeiture is a
punishment. The Court determined from the language of the statute and
from the statute’s legislative history that civil forfeitures can indeed
constitute punishments and are thus subject to Eighth Amendment
Excessive Fines Clause analysis. 74 The Court noted that the statute
included an “innocent owner” defense for those whose property was
involved in criminal conduct without knowledge. 75 The Court inferred
from this exception that Congress intended to punish those involved in the
criminal conduct covered by the statute (in this case, drug trafficking). 76
Further, Congress explained in the statute’s legislative history “that the
traditional criminal sanction of fine and imprisonment are inadequate to
deter or punish the enormously profitable trade in dangerous drugs.” 77
For the purposes of this Comment, it is important to distinguish
between criminal and civil forfeitures. 78 To constitute a fine under the
Eighth Amendment, the forfeiture must be a punishment. 79 Criminal
subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.

U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Sixth Amendment reads:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury of the State and district where in the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
71
Austin, 509 U.S. at 608-09 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco
Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 294 (1989)).
72
Austin, 509 U.S. at 609–10.
73
Id. at 610.
74
Id. at 621–22.
75
Id. at 619.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 620 (quoting S. Rep. No. 98-225, at 191 (1983)).
78
The Orange County district attorney’s DNA collection program exists in a gray area
between in rem and in personam forfeiture. See infra Part III.
79
Austin, 509 U.S. at 624 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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forfeiture punishes the owner’s criminal conduct by taking his property; it is
not necessary to establish a nexus between the property and the criminal
conduct. 80 As a prerequisite for criminal forfeiture, there must be a
criminal conviction. Civil forfeiture, however, is based on the legal fiction
that the property itself bears some guilt in the matter.81
The Court’s jurisprudence on the Excessive Fines Clause leaves the
matter unsettled but does provide some guidelines for future excessive fines
analysis. Monetary penalties or property forfeitures as part of a criminal
sentence are the most obvious types of fines. A criminal conviction is a
necessary condition for the government to impose these fines.
The question of whether a government action is a fine is more difficult
in the civil context. The threshold question, as established in BrowningFerris and Austin, is whether the government action is punitive. Once a
government action taken against an individual (or his property) is
determined to be a fine, the next step in the analysis is to determine whether
it is excessive.
Since Austin, three approaches have developed to determine
excessiveness. The first is a proportionality approach taken by the majority
in Austin and later adopted by the Eighth Circuit. 82 Courts applying this
approach compare the fine levied with the offense to determine whether the
fine was proportional to the offense.
In United States v. Bieri, the Eighth Circuit acknowledged the lack of
guidance from the Supreme Court on a multi-factor test for excessiveness
and then created its own test. 83 First, the defendant has the burden of
showing that the fine is grossly disproportionate to the offense.84 Second,
“The [E]ighth [A]mendment demands that a constitutionally cognizable
disproportionality reach such a level of excessiveness that in justice the
punishment is more criminal than the crime.” 85 Relevant factors in
determining the proportionality of the fine are the extent and duration of the
criminal conduct, the gravity of the offense weighed against the sanction,
and the value of the property forfeited. 86
The general principle of the proportionality approach is that the gravity
of the fine should not grossly exceed the culpability of the defendant. The
80

Id.
Id.
82
See United States v. Premises Known as 6040 Wentworth Ave. South, Minneapolis,
Hennepin Cnty., Minn., 123 F.3d 685 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Alexander, 108 F.3d
853 (8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Bieri, 68 F.3d 232, 236 (8th Cir. 1995).
83
Bieri, 68 F.3d at 236.
84
Id.
85
Id. (quoting United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716, 724 (3d Cir. 1993)).
86
Id.
81
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burden is on the defendant, however, to show that the fine is grossly
disproportionate to the offense. This creates a serious hurdle for individuals
fined by the government to clear before proving that the fine levied against
them was excessive.
The second approach to determining excessiveness is an
instrumentality approach, first described by Justice Scalia in his concurring
opinion to Austin. 87 The instrumentality approach maintains elements of
the traditional rule that the fictional guilt of the property itself warranted its
forfeiture. Justice Scalia’s argument is that the only relevant question in an
excessiveness analysis is whether the property forfeited played an
instrumental role in the illegal activity. “Scales used to measure out
unlawful drug sales, for example, are confiscable whether made of the
purest gold or the basest metal. . . . The question is not how much the
confiscated property is worth, but whether the confiscated property has a
close enough relationship to the offense.” 88
The Fourth Circuit adopted a three-part instrumentality test in United
States v. Chandler when it determined that the forfeiture of a thirty-three
acre farm worth $569,000 was not excessive. 89 The court upheld the
forfeiture because defendants had “distributed, packaged, sold, purchased
and used controlled substances, including marijuana, cocaine and
quaaludes,” on the property and the property played an integral role in the
illegal activity. 90 The court considered “(1) the nexus between the offense
and the property and the extent of the property’s role in the offense, (2) the
role and culpability of the owner, and (3) the possibility of separating
offending property that can readily be separated from the remainder.”91
In applying the instrumentality approach, the court looked to
Congress’s intent in creating the statute that the defendant allegedly
violated. Because Congress’s intent was to punish drug traffickers, the key
question—according to courts using the instrumentality approach—should
be how tainted is the property by the illegal activity and not how valuable is
the property relative to the gravity of the offense. 92
87

Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 624 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 627–28.
89
United States v. Chandler, 36 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1994), overruled by United States v.
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334–35 (1998) (overruling three-part instrumentality test).
90
Id. at 361.
91
Id. at 365.
92
Id. at 364.
88

Forfeiture of a $14 million yacht, specially outfitted with high-powered motors, radar, and secret
compartments for the sole purpose of transporting drugs from a foreign country into the United
States, would probably offend no one’s sense of excessiveness, even though the property has
such a high value. On the other hand, forfeiture of a row house, which is owned by an elderly
woman and which shelters her children and grandchildren, upon discovery of a trace amount of
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For several years, courts were split on whether to apply the
proportionality approach or the instrumentality approach.93 The Supreme
Court resolved the confusion over the proper test for excessiveness in
United States v. Bajakajian. 94 In that case, police dogs stopped Bajakajian
at the airport as he was preparing to board an international flight with
$357,144 in cash. 95 He was found to be in violation of a statute forbidding
the removal of more than $10,000 in cash without declaration and was
ordered to forfeit all $357,144 to the United States government as part of
his penalty. 96

cocaine in a grandson’s room, might arguably be found to be excessive, even though the house
has a relatively low value of $30,000. In both cases, the intuitive excessiveness analysis centers
on the relationship between the property and the offense—the more incidental or fortuitous the
involvement of the property in the offense, the stronger the argument that its forfeiture is
excessive. When measuring the strength or extent of the property’s relationship to the offense,
i.e., its instrumentality in the offense, we would look at whether the property’s role was
supportive, important, or even necessary to the success of the illegal activity. We would also
inquire into whether the use of the property was deliberate or planned, as distinguished from
incidental or fortuitous. We would note whether the property was used once or repeatedly,
whether a small portion was used, and whether the property was put to other uses and the extent
of those uses.

Id.
93

Some courts have developed hybrid approaches incorporating the proportionality and
instrumentality tests. One hybrid approach that has gained somewhat widespread acceptance
is that taken by the Second Circuit in United States v. Milbrand, 58 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1995).
The court held that a test for excessiveness depends on:
(1) the nexus between the offense and the property and the extent of the property’s role in the
offense, (2) the role and culpability of the owner, and (3) the possibility of separating offending
property that can readily be separated from the remainder. In measuring the strength and extent
of the nexus between the property and the offense, a court may take into account the following
factors: (1) whether the use of the property in the offense was deliberate and planned or merely
incidental and fortuitous; (2) whether the property was important to the success of the illegal
activity; (3) the time during which the property was illegally used and the spatial extent of its
use; (4) whether its illegal use was an isolated event or had been repeated; and (5) whether the
purpose of acquiring, maintaining or using the property was to carry out the offense. No one
factor is dispositive but, to sustain a forfeiture against an Eighth Amendment challenge, the court
must be able to conclude, under the totality of circumstances, that the property was a substantial
and meaningful instrumentality in the commission of the offense, or would have been, had the
offensive conduct been carried out as intended.

Id. at 846.
The hybrid approach allows the court to consider many factors in determining whether
the fine is excessive. A multi-pronged approach has the benefit of addressing any fairness
concerns that may arise from strict adherence to the proportionality approach or the
instrumentality approach. The hybrid approach, however, may be too detailed to be
consistently applied.
94
524 U.S. 321 (1998).
95
Id. at 324.
96
Id. at 324–25. The statute states, in relevant part: “The court, in imposing sentence on
a person convicted of an offense in violation of section 1956, 1957, or 1960 of this title, shall
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In its analysis, the Court cited back to Austin for the principle that
whether a government proceeding is in rem or in personam, the key
question in determining whether the action is a fine is whether it is a
punishment. 97 The Court “ha[d] little trouble concluding that the forfeiture
of currency ordered by § 982(a)(1) constitutes punishment.” 98 The next
question, then, was whether the fine was excessive.
The Ninth Circuit had applied a hybrid test in its analysis of
Bajakajian’s claim. 99 The Supreme Court, however, rejected this test and
stated definitively that a proportionality approach was the proper way to
analyze the excessiveness of a fine under the Excessive Fines Clause. A
fine must be “grossly disproportional” to the offense in order to constitute
an excessive fine.100 The Court looked to the text and history of the Eighth
Amendment and remarked that neither source helped to determine exactly
how grossly disproportional a fine must be to become unconstitutional.101
Instead, the Court identified two relevant sources. First, the Court held that
judgments on the appropriate level of punishment for a particular offense
should be made by the legislature.102 When the legislature determines the
types and limits of punishment for a particular crime, it is making a policy
judgment within its Constitutional authority and should be given great
deference by courts. 103 Second, the judiciary should be guided by the
Supreme Court’s 1983 decision in Solem v. Helm, 104 which established a
test for when punishment is cruel and unusual. 105
In Solem, the Court held that although it would rarely uphold
challenges to punishments on Eighth Amendment grounds outside of the
capital punishment context, it would still consider several factors in
questioning the constitutionality of a particular punishment.106 This
particular case involved a challenge to a criminal sentence on the grounds
order that the person forfeit to the United States any property, real or personal, involved in
such offense, or any property traceable to such property.” 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (2006).
97
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 331 n.6.
98
Id. at 328.
99
Id. at 326 (stating that the Ninth Circuit held that “to satisfy the Excessive Fines
Clause, a forfeiture must fulfill two conditions: The property forfeited must be an
‘instrumentality’ of the crime committed, and the value of the property must be proportional
to the culpability of the owner.”). For a more detailed explanation of the hybrid approach,
see supra note 93.
100
Id. at 334.
101
Id. at 335.
102
Id. at 336.
103
Id. (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983) and Gore v. United States, 357
U.S. 386, 393 (1958)).
104
Solem, 463 U.S. at 277.
105
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336.
106
Solem, 463 U.S. at 290.
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that the sentence was cruel and unusual. 107 The first factor is a comparison
between the crime and the penalty—essentially a proportionality test. 108
The second factor is a comparison between sentences of other criminals in
the jurisdiction for various crimes to get a sense of the range of acceptable
sentences in the jurisdiction. 109 Third is a comparison between the
defendant’s sentence and the sentences given for similar crimes in different
jurisdictions. 110
Relying on this analysis from Solem, the Court addressed the fine
levied on Bajakajian. His principal offense was that he did not report the
money he tried to carry onto the plane; carrying the currency would have
been legal had he reported it.111 The statute was enacted to prevent drug
traffickers, and requiring Bajakajian to forfeit the entire $357,144 would
not further the goals of the statute. 112 Second, the sentencing guidelines
allowed a maximum six-month sentence and fine of $5,000 for conviction
under the particular section of the statute that Bajakajian allegedly
violated. 113 Similar behavior to Bajakajian’s would presumably net a much
lighter sentence in other courts and jurisdictions.114 On the basis of these
two factors, the Court held that requiring forfeiture of the entire $357,144
was an excessive fine and, for the first time in its history, invalidated a
government-imposed fine as unconstitutional under the Excessive Fines
Clause. 115
Moving forward, the Supreme Court—and presumably lower courts—
will likely evaluate Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause challenges
using the framework it established in Bajakajian. 116 The two sources of
information relevant to the determination of whether a fine is excessive are
the legislature and the courts.117 If the fine imposed by the government is
“grossly disproportional” to the punishment that the legislature intended or
that the courts are dispensing for the same or similar crimes, then it is
excessive. 118

107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 337–38 (1998).
Id.
Id. at 338.
Id. at 339.
Id. at 344.
See id.
Id.
Id.
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Much of the discussion of excessive fines in this Comment has focused
on forfeitures of property. For the forfeiture of a DNA sample to be
considered a fine, DNA must first be considered personal property. The
next part of this comment explores the current debate on whether DNA is
personal property.
IV. DNA AS PERSONAL PROPERTY
The Framers almost certainly did not contemplate the complexities of
genetics when they drafted the Eighth Amendment. Recent actions by state
legislatures and the California Supreme Court provide some insight into the
question of whether courts will recognize DNA as personal property in the
context of an Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause challenge to the
county’s DNA collection program. In light of recent statutory trends
towards recognizing a personal property interest in one’s DNA for
employment and insurance purposes, it seems that DNA should be
recognized as personal property in the criminal context as well.
In response to the possibility of genetic discrimination by insurance
companies, some states have acted to protect an individual’s right to her
own genetic information. Four states—Alaska, Colorado, Florida, and
Georgia—define the genetic information contained in DNA molecules as
personal property by statute. 119 Of the four states, Alaska recognizes the
most comprehensive individual right to one’s own DNA. The Alaska
statute contains an explicit provision stating, “A DNA sample and the
results of a DNA analysis performed on the sample are the exclusive
property of the person sampled or analyzed.” 120 The three other statutes
refer to an individual’s property right in his or her genetic information.121
One possible interpretation is that the Alaska statute protects both the
genetic information stored on the DNA molecule and the physical sample
itself. The Colorado, Florida, and Georgia statutes may only protect the
actual genetic information, which may be indicative of risk factors for
certain health conditions, and not the physical sample. It bears mentioning,
however, that it would be difficult to parse “genetic information” from a
119
ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010(a)(2) (2008) (“[A] DNA sample and the results of a DNA
analysis performed on the sample are the exclusive property of the person sampled or
analyzed.”); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7(1)(a) (West 2010) (“Genetic information
is the unique property of the individual to whom the information pertains.”); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 760.40(2)(a) (West 2010) (“[T]he results of such DNA analysis, whether held by a
public or private entity, are the exclusive property of the person tested, are confidential, and
may not be disclosed without the consent of the person tested.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-541(1) (West 2003) (“Genetic information is the unique property of the individual tested.”).
120
ALASKA STAT. § 18.13.010(a)(2).
121
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7(1)(a); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40(2)(a); GA.
CODE ANN. § 33-54-1(1).
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“DNA sample” because one cannot extract the genetic information from an
individual without taking a physical DNA sample.
Another relevant consideration is the context in which the statutes
were written. The Alaska and Florida statutes serve as general bans on the
misappropriation of another person’s genetic information.122 The Colorado
and Georgia statutes address concerns that insurance companies would use
genetic information to discriminate against potential customers on the basis
of some genetic indicators of possible pre-existing or future conditions. 123
Although both statutes serve the purpose of protecting consumers from
prying insurance companies, it seems reasonable to infer a property interest
in one’s DNA that would extend to other contexts.
Congress recognized an individual’s interest in freedom from genetic
discrimination by employers when it enacted the Genetic Information
Nondiscrimination Act (GINA) in 2008. 124 GINA prohibits employers
from requesting, requiring, or purchasing genetic information from
potential or current employees or their family members. 125 Employers
cannot use genetic information to make any decisions relevant to
employment, including discharge and compensation.126
The bill was passed 95–0 in the Senate and 414–1 in the House. 127
The overwhelming margin by which GINA was passed suggests that
Congress recognizes a personal interest in genetic information. Underlying
the aforementioned state statutes and GINA seems to be a concern that an
innocent person’s genetic information could be used against them. Courts,
however, have not yet definitely answered the question of whether DNA is
personal property.
The California Supreme Court has come closest to addressing whether
genetic information is personal property. The most prominent case on the

122

Neither the Alaska statute nor the Florida statute contains language suggesting that
the statutes were enacted to protect consumers against insurance companies, though the
Florida statute requires entities to notify individuals if genetic information was used to deny
them insurance. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.40(3).
123
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-3-1104.7(1)(d) (“The intent of this section is to prevent
information derived from genetic testing from being used to deny access to group disability
insurance or long-term care insurance coverage.”); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1(4) (“The intent
of this chapter is to prevent accident and sickness insurance companies, health maintenance
organizations, managed care organizations, and other payors from using information derived
from genetic testing to deny access to accident and sickness insurance.”).
124
Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881
(2008).
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Congressman Ron Paul was the lone dissenter. 145 Cong. Rec. H2980 (2008).
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subject is Moore v. The Regents of the University of California. 128
Although Moore does not directly address whether genetic information is
personal property, the court’s discussion provides insight into how a
modern court would analyze an argument that a litigant holds an actionable
interest in his own DNA. In that case, the plaintiff (Moore) underwent
treatment for hairy-cell leukemia at UCLA Medical Center.129 In the course
of treatment, defendant physicians conducted a splenectomy and regularly
removed blood, bone marrow aspirate, and other bodily substances. 130
Moore, under the impression that the splenectomy was necessary to save his
life, signed a consent form for the procedure.131 Unbeknownst to Moore,
his doctors were using the material they extracted from him to develop a
highly lucrative commercial cell line from which they planned to make a
considerable profit. 132 Moore filed suit, alleging breach of fiduciary duty
and conversion of his personal property. 133 The California Supreme Court’s
analysis of his conversion claim provides a relevant insight into one answer
to the DNA-as-personal-property question. 134
The foundation of Moore’s claim of conversion was that he had a
proprietary interest in any product that might be created from his cells.135
This was a departure from traditional conversion theory because the
plaintiff must have actual ownership or possession of the good that the
defendant converts. 136 Further, physical possession of one’s cells—or any
other human tissue—after their removal in a scientific procedure was
prohibited by statute in California. 137
Moore failed to convince the court to extend conversion liability to his
particular case for three reasons. First, the court considered the policy
implications of extending liability, 138 acknowledging tension between
128

51 Cal. 3d 120 (Cal. 1990).
Id. at 125.
130
Id. at 125–26.
131
Id. at 126.
132
Id.
133
Id. at 128.
134
The court defined conversion as “the plaintiff was possessed of certain goods, that he
casually lost them, that the defendant found them, and that the defendant did not return them,
but instead ‘converted them to his own use.’ From that phrase in the pleading came the
name of the tort.” Id. at 135 (quoting PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 89 (W.
Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984)).
135
Moore, 51 Cal. 3d at 135.
136
Id. at 136.
137
Id. at 137 (“Human tissues . . . following conclusion of scientific use shall be
disposed of by interment, incineration, or any other method determined by the state
department [of health services] to protect the public health and safety.”) (quoting CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7054.4 (West 2007)).
138
Id. at 142–43.
129

2011]

EVERYBODY’S GOT A PRICE

327

competing policy goals. 139 The judicial system should provide recourse to
patients whose doctors act with motives other than the patient’s health that
may affect their professional decision-making. 140 The judicial system
should also, however, allow doctors to engage in the “socially useful”
practice of medical research without fear of liability when there is no reason
to believe that a patient would object to their work. 141 Ultimately, the court
determined that laws governing disclosure of information to patients cover
the dispute better than subjecting doctors to tort liability for conversion.142
The court’s second rationale for rejecting Moore’s claim was that
major changes in policy are best suited for the legislature.143 Third, the
court argued that a cause of action for conversion is not necessary to protect
patients because laws governing disclosure of information serve that
purpose more effectively than tort liability. 144
One reading of Moore suggests that the California Supreme Court
would be unsympathetic to a claim that an individual’s DNA is his or her
personal property. Several details in the Moore decision indicate, however,
that the court’s decision may not be the final word on whether DNA is
personal property.
The court explicitly stated that Moore could not expect to maintain an
ownership interest in his cells once they had been removed. 145 For Moore
to lose an ownership interest in his cells, he had to have some original
ownership interest in the biological material. For an individual to
relinquish his property interest by signing a consent form, he must have a
property interest to relinquish. The court also noted that the commercial
cell line from which the defendants profited was a fundamentally different
product than the cells excised from Moore. This distinction does not exist
between DNA in the body and DNA as stored as a sample in a database.
Finally, the court explicitly reserved the question of whether Moore’s
DNA is his personal property. 146 After Moore, it is unclear whether a
California court would recognize DNA as personal property.
A variety of arguments have been made both for and against
recognition of DNA as personal property. It is beyond the scope of this

139
140
141
142
143
144
145
146

Id.
Id. at 143.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 147.
Id.
Id. at 136–37.
Id. at 135.

328

MICHAEL PURTILL

[Vol. 101

Comment to fully explore current scholarship on this topic.147 The debate
over whether DNA is personal property will likely continue until Congress
or the Supreme Court decisively resolves the question. For the purposes of
the analysis, however, this Comment sides with the Alaska, Colorado,
Georgia, and Florida legislatures and the Congress that enacted GINA in
determining that DNA is the personal property of the individual to whom
the genetic information belongs.
V. IS THE FORFEITURE OF AN ARRESTEE’S DNA AN EXCESSIVE FINE
UNDER THE EIGHTH AMENDMENT?
A government program that punishes individuals without granting
them a criminal trial is inherently suspicious. The county’s DNA collection
program exists in a gray area between civil and criminal action. One of the
essential components of the county’s program is that it is a substitute for a
criminal conviction. As a result, it does not fit neatly into criminal
forfeiture analysis. The government’s action is not distinctly civil either; it
exists within the criminal justice system. Although an argument could be
made that one’s genetic material is always instrumental to the commission
of any offense, it is almost impossible that such an argument fits within the
“guilty property” fiction used to justify civil forfeitures in rem prior to
Austin and Bajakajian.
The county program, however, should be challenged as an excessive
fine under the Eighth Amendment. The analysis begins with the text and
purpose of the Eighth Amendment. The purpose of the Amendment, as

147

See Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U. L. REV. 359
(2000) (exploring the various judicial and legislative approaches to the question of what
property interests an individual has in his or her own body); see also Leigh M. Harlan, When
Privacy Fails: Invoking a Property Paradigm to Mandate the Destruction of DNA Samples,
54 DUKE L.J. 179 (2004) (arguing that the proper legal challenges to databases that maintain
DNA samples for purposes other than particular criminal investigations are on property
grounds). Harlan contends that the Fourth Amendment is inadequate to protect individuals’
DNA from permanent databases and that labor, utilitarian, and personality arguments all
justify the recognition of DNA as personal property. Thus the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments would provide more adequate protection of individual rights. See also Erik S.
Jaffe, Note, “She’s Got Bette Davis[’s] Eyes”: Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of
Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 528
(1990) (arguing that laws authorizing coroners to remove tissue from cadavers without the
consent of the deceased’s next of kin violates the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause and the
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause).
The issue of human organ trafficking is another interesting point for discussion that is
tangentially related to DNA collection statutes. For further reading, see Theodore Silver,
The Case for a Post-Mortem Organ Draft and a Proposed Model Organ Draft Act, 68 B.U.
L. REV. 681 (1988) (arguing that there is no property right to post-mortem organs and that
the National Organ Transplant Act makes human organs valueless on the open market).
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interpreted by the Supreme Court in Browning-Ferris and Austin, is to limit
the prosecutorial power of the government. 148
By collecting DNA samples from arrestees in circumvention of the
federal and state DNA collection statutes, the district attorney’s office has
expanded its prosecutorial power in several ways. First, inclusion in a
DNA database makes the individual a de facto person of interest in any
crime in which a DNA sample taken from the crime scene is checked
against the database. Law enforcement agencies have greater access to a
larger number of potential suspects without having to do the field work that
would be necessary absent a database of DNA data. 149 This is a significant
expansion of the county’s prosecutorial power.
The statutes that authorize DNA collection in all fifty states and by the
federal government have provisions that order the destruction of the sample
and removal from the database upon the fulfillment of certain
circumstances. These conditions include acquittal, completion of sentence,
and having the charges dropped, upon which every state statute authorizing
the collection of DNA from arrestees calls for the destruction of collected
samples. 150 The county operates its database without such safeguards.
These problems suggest that the county government is operating beyond its
prescribed scope of prosecutorial power and that it is using the DNA
collection program to further expand the scope of the prosecutorial power.
One argument against this interpretation is that the county, by
dropping criminal charges against arrestees, is actually relinquishing its
prosecutorial power. Although this is a relevant consideration, on balance
the state emerges from the “exchange” with a lasting DNA sample while the
arrestee emerges with a one-time reprieve from criminal prosecution for a
misdemeanor offense. The county does not actually “relinquish” anything,
given that it makes the decision whether to offer the deal to an arrestee and
holds a lasting power over the arrestee by keeping his DNA on file
permanently without limitation. The county maintains the power to
prosecute any arrestee who declines the offer. At no point does the county
relinquish the prosecutorial power. It merely chooses whether to exercise it
immediately (through criminal prosecution) or “save it for later” (by taking
a DNA sample).
148
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1992); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt.,
Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 266 (1988).
149
Expanded DNA databases are increasingly valuable tools for law enforcement
agencies. One article reports that it takes only 500 microseconds to search a database of
100,000 profiles. Tony Duster, DNA Dragnets and Race: Larger Social Context, History,
and Future, GENEWATCH, http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/GeneWatch/
GeneWatchPage.aspx?pageId=56&archive=yes (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).
150
See supra Part II.
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The next question in an excessive fines analysis is whether the
government action is punitive. The district attorney’s office suggested
several purposes for its program. The program could deter potential
criminals, help the law enforcement in future investigations, and reduce the
burden on the stressed district attorney’s office and law enforcement
agencies. 151 The stated purpose of deterrence is an obvious indicator that
the government views the program as a punishment. “Deterrence . . . has
traditionally been viewed as a goal of punishment.” 152 The publication of
this program to county residents has the possible effect of deterring conduct
that would result in a misdemeanor arrest and thus the offer for inclusion in
the database. This is a general deterrent and can be interpreted as a
punishment. An alternative argument for considering the program to be a
punishment is the government’s targeting of arrestees facing trial. If this
program was not a punitive device, the county government could simply
inform individuals that they may submit a sample to the county’s DNA
database as a public safety measure. By targeting suspected criminals, the
county manages to focus squarely on deterring criminal behavior through
alternative punishment.
The timing of the offer also indicates that the county intends the
program to be punitive. Consider again the example of Charlie Wolcott,
who went into the county court house to fight his misdemeanor trespassing
charge:
Before he was called in front of the judge, Wolcott . . . w[as] called into a soundproof
room in the back of the court. There, Deputy Dist. Atty. Nicholas Zovko made [him]
an offer. “He takes me and one other guy to the back of the courtroom, and says
basically, ‘The district attorney’s office would like to make a deal with you,’” Wolcott
153
said. “‘If you give a DNA sample, we will drop all charges.’”

The county presumably could have offered this particular deal to
Wolcott at the time of arrest or when notifying him of his court date.
Instead, the Deputy District Attorney chose the moment before Wolcott was
about to go in front of the judge to offer a sort of alternative arrangement.
The purpose of the program is ultimately to reduce crime and make the
law enforcement process more efficient. To accomplish this goal, the
government seeks to take DNA samples from arrestees and store them in a
database for future investigations. The county’s actions suggest a clear
punitive intent to the program. Perhaps the most telling is a quote from the
district attorney’s office: “There’s consequences when you commit a crime.

151
152
153

Abdollah, supra note 10, at A1.
United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 329 (1998).
Abdollah, supra note 1, at A3.
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This is actually a better option for them than other avenues, of, I guess,
going through the penal process.” 154
Although the purpose of the program suggests that providing a DNA
sample is punitive, perhaps the effect of the program on individuals is more
powerful evidence of its punitive nature. Permanent inclusion in a DNA
database used exclusively for criminal investigations has a powerful
punitive effect on the individual. Judge Reinhardt of the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals perhaps best summarized the punitive effect of inclusion
in such a database:
Every time new evidence is discovered from a crime scene, the government will
search [the defendant’s] genetic code to determine whether he has committed the
crime—just as the government might search his house for evidence linking him to the
crime scene—despite the fact that the government may never have cause to suspect
155
him again.

Though jurors and viewers of CSI may consider DNA evidence to be
error-proof, there are significant risks associated with over-reliance on
DNA evidence. 156 These lifelong concerns for individuals who submit to
the county’s program suggest that the program should be considered
punitive under an Eighth Amendment excessive fines analysis.
The next question in the excessive fines analysis is whether the fine is
excessive. One must first assume that DNA is personal property. As
discussed in Part IV, there are statutory and case law grounds for
considering one’s DNA as his or her personal property. Even if it is
personal property, however, genetic material does not fit within the
framework of any statute authorizing forfeiture of property. 157 These
154

Abdollah, supra note 10, at A1.
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 870 (9th Cir. 2004) (Reinhardt, J.,
dissenting).
156
It is possible, when searching against a large database, for a “cold hit” to match a
sample at a crime scene with an innocent individual. Further, human error can contaminate,
mislabel, and misinterpret DNA evidence. See William C. Thompson, The Potential for
Error in Forensic DNA Testing, GENEWATCH, http://www.councilforresponsiblegenetics.org/
GeneWatch/GeneWatchPage.aspx?pageId=57&archive=yes (last visited Nov. 12, 2010).
157
See 18 U.S.C. § 1955(d) (2006):
155

(d) Any property, including money, used in violation of the provisions of this section may be
seized and forfeited to the United States. All provisions of law relating to the seizures, summary,
and judicial forfeiture procedures, and condemnation of vessels, vehicles, merchandise, and
baggage for violation of the customs laws; the disposition of such vessels, vehicles, merchandise,
and baggage or the proceeds from such sale; the remission or mitigation of such forfeitures; and
the compromise of claims and the award of compensation to informers in respect of such
forfeitures shall apply to seizures and forfeitures incurred or alleged to have been incurred under
the provisions of this section, insofar as applicable and not inconsistent with such provisions.
Such duties as are imposed upon the collector of customs or any other person in respect to the
seizure and forfeiture of vessels, vehicles, merchandise, and baggage under the customs laws
shall be performed with respect to seizures and forfeitures of property used or intended for use in
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statutes assume a tangible nexus between the prohibited action being
punished and the property being forfeited. One obvious argument is that
one’s genetic makeup is a necessary component of every action (including
illegal actions) that the individual takes. These statutes, however, clearly
draw a distinction between the individual and his property. It seems highly
improbable that Congress would draw a distinction between an individual
and his genetic material to make such a determination.
In Part III, this Comment discussed the analytical framework that
future courts will likely use in evaluating Excessive Fines Clause cases.
The fine must be grossly disproportional to the offense for it to be
excessive. 158 Courts will look to two sources: the legislature (to determine
what punishment the legislature thought was appropriate for the offense)
and other courts (to determine whether the punishment is consistent with
that for similar crimes.) 159 Using this analytical framework for determining
excessiveness, the forfeiture of DNA as an alternative punishment for
criminal misdemeanor charges may be excessive.
The first consideration is how the punishment relates to the appropriate
punishment for the offense set out by the legislature. 160 The appropriate
punishment for a misdemeanor conviction varies, but the individuals
subjected to the Orange County fine are not convicts. The presumption of
innocence stays with a criminal defendant until he is found guilty, and it is
unjust to punish him absent due process of law. Until there is a guilty plea,
the defendant should maintain the right to be free from government
punishment, especially in a misdemeanor case in which there would be no
threat to society from his release while awaiting trial.
Another consideration, however, is that the program simply offers an
alternative to the penal process and allows individuals to get out of criminal
charges without a blemish on their criminal records. The defendant has a
choice in this matter: he can elect to stand trial and fight the charges or he
can submit a DNA sample, pay $75, and move on from the incident.
Perhaps a court would consider that to be appropriate given the nature of
the charges facing defendants eligible for this program. On balance,
however, significant weight should be given to the presumption of
innocence that attaches to a criminal defendant. Further, if the county were
to follow the guidelines set forth by the state and federal DNA databases, it
would not be able to maintain DNA samples from individuals convicted of
non-violent misdemeanors permanently without destroying them after a
violation of this section by such officers, agents, or other persons as may be designated for that
purpose by the Attorney General.
158
159
160
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certain period. This suggests disproportionality between the offense and the
punishment.
The second consideration in the Bajakajian test is whether the
defendant’s punishment is consistent with the punishment for similar
crimes:
In sum, a court’s proportionality analysis under the Eighth Amendment should be
guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness
of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction;
and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
161
jurisdictions.

Currently, Orange County is alone in operating such a program, so it is
unclear how other jurisdictions would treat such a program. The Court in
Bajakajian, however, declined to declare a bright-line rule on excessiveness
because it felt that the question of the appropriateness of punishment was
best left to the legislature.162 It is important to note at this point that no
legislature has actually authorized the Orange County district attorney’s
plan; it is currently an executive action without legislative approval. This
may suggest a greater susceptibility to being struck down.
VI. CONCLUSION
Challenges under the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause are
rare. The overreaching nature of the Orange County district attorney’s plan,
however, raises a variety of legal and moral questions, and the question of
whether this is an excessive fine is an important one.
Criminal defendants are entitled to the presumption of innocence. This
presumption is fundamental to our criminal justice system and should not
be disrupted. A non-violent misdemeanor arrestee should not be faced with
the prospect of defending himself against criminal charges or subjecting
himself to a lifetime of criminal investigations simply because a prosecutor
offers a quick fix for his minor legal problem. The county plan, however,
presents individuals with this choice moments before they are scheduled to
face a judge. As it stands, the county program gives the county expanded
prosecutorial power over non-violent misdemeanor arrestees that do not get
the benefit of trial. This expansion of prosecutorial power is exactly what
the Eighth Amendment was designed to protect against.
In Bajakajian, the Court held that it would consider the gravity of the
offense and the harshness of the penalty when determining whether a fine is
excessive. 163 Under the county program, an arrested individual who has not
161
162
163

Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983).
Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 336.
Id. at 336–37.
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been convicted an offense is still subject to a lifetime of criminal
investigations any time the county chooses to run a DNA sample from a
crime scene against its DNA database. This is a harsher penalty than a
convict faces under statutes that require the destruction of the sample after
the convict has completed his sentence.164 A program that subjects an
unconvicted individual to a harsher penalty than what he or she would face
if convicted is excessive and should not stand up to a challenge under the
Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause.

164

See supra Part II.

